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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a statistics-based anomaly
detection technique for identifying systems that could have
beencompromised andhad trojan executables installed. At-
tackers frequently install rootkits and other trojan ﬁles onto
hosts they compromise so they can easily gain access in
the future. Many detection systems use signatures to iden-
tify unauthorized ﬁles, but signatures for all platforms and
patch levels do not exist in large-scale environments, such
as government and university networks. Our anomaly de-
tection system organizes hosts into clusters based on their
ﬁles and uses statistics to identify those that should be ex-
amined in more detail.
1. Introduction
When a computer is attacked and compromised, it is
common for the attacker to modify the system such that he
can easily gain access to it in the future and that he can per-
form actions that will not be observed by users or adminis-
trators. One way to modify the system is to replace system
executableswith trojan versions. This behavior has been re-
ported to Internet mailing lists [13], has been documented
by the Honeynet Group [5], and has been observed by our-
selves while performing computer forensics.
The typical method of identifying a trojan ﬁle is to com-
pare it to a known and trusted version. This works well on a
small scale, but does not scale in an environmentwith thou-
sands of hosts that have different administrators, have dif-
ferent operating systems, and have different patch levels.
The administrators may need a copy of every ﬁle from ev-
ery operating system deployed and every patch released.
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System executables, such as /bin/ls or /bin/ps,
are commonlymodiﬁed by an attacker because many rootk-
its will replace them with ones that hide data from the
user. For example, a trojan /bin/ls executable can hide
the ﬁles and directories that the attacker created. Network
servers are also modiﬁed so that they grant access to unau-
thorized users. For example, SSH servers can be modiﬁed
sothattheyallowtheattackertologinifheprovidesamagic
password. The password is compiled into the server exe-
cutable and logs are not created when this password is used.
In this work, we propose a statistical-based anomaly de-
tection procedure to identify systems that have trojan ﬁles
onthem.Theprocedurecanbeusedbylarge-scalenetworks
where not all hosts are regularly patched, monitored, or ad-
ministered. Some government and university networks fall
into this category.Section 2 details previous work in detect-
ingtrojanexecutables,Section3 describesourprocess,Sec-
tion4describesourimplementationoftheprocess,andSec-
tion 5 gives future work.
2. Related Work
Existing work on detecting trojan executables has been
orientedtowardssmall-scaleenvironments.Theexecutables
on each host are examined to identify if they have been
modiﬁed and the central theme is to compare the existing
ﬁles to a known good or known bad object. Existing tech-
nology uses both of these comparisons to identify trojan
ﬁles.
One common method of detecting a malicious ﬁle is by
calculating a one-way hash of it and comparing it to val-
ues stored in a database. Examples of commonly used hash
functions include MD5 [11] and SHA-1 [9]. When any bit
in the ﬁle changes, the MD5 or SHA-1 value will change
as well. Therefore, the hash value can be used as a unique
identiﬁer, or ﬁngerprint, for the ﬁle.Hash databases exist for both known good and known
bad ﬁles. The National Institute for Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) has produced the National Software Reference
Library (NSRL) that contains hashes of both known good
and knownbad ﬁles [10]. Currently,the majority of the ﬁles
are based on the Microsoft Windows operatingsystem, so it
isnotasusefulfordetectingmodiﬁcationstoUnixﬁles.An-
other common hash database is Hashkeeper [4], which also
contains both known good and known bad ﬁles.
Sun has developed the Solaris Fingerprint Database [14]
on its web site that allows users to enter the MD5 hash of
ﬁles into a form and the web site will identify which Solaris
ﬁle that the hash corresponds to. This allows you to easily
identifyif the ﬁle is a validSolaris executable.Similar func-
tionality exists with the rpm command [12] in Linux. Both
of these databases provide a record of known good ﬁles.
Databases of only knownbad ﬁles also exist. The Cyber-
Abuse Rootk(it)ID Project is a collection of known rootk-
its [2]. Maintaining a database of known bad ﬁles is very
difﬁcult because it requires you to constantly update the
database when new “bad” things are found. Whereas, a
database of known good ﬁles only requires updating when
you update a host with new “good” ﬁles.
Another alternative is to calculate the hashes of ﬁles be-
fore the system is deployed. You can create the database
with the md5sum command [3], the md5deep command
[6], or with monitoring tools [15]. Similarly, an investiga-
tor can use hashes from a trusted system that is known to
have the same patches applied as the suspect system. Hash
databasesmadebythesetools canbeprocessedusinga sim-
ple text search tool grep, the lookup option in md5deep,
or binary search tools [1].
Whenavailable,hashdatabasesare veryefﬁcientat iden-
tifying trojan executables. The problem is having them
availableforuse.Hashesofsystemexecutablesaretypically
not calculated before a system is deployed and there are not
enough hash databases with all patches to all systems to ef-
fectively rely on. Similarly, new trojan ﬁles are created ev-
ery day and the trojan source code will create many exe-
cutables and hashes depending on what compiler was used.
Another technique to detect trojan ﬁles is to use sig-
nature analysis. Some trojan ﬁles have certain characteris-
tics that can be identiﬁed. For example, executables from
a system-level rootkit typically use a conﬁguration ﬁle that
lists which ﬁles or processes to hide from the user. The path
to the conﬁguration ﬁle may be found by looking at the
ASCII strings in the executable. Or, the conﬁguration ﬁle
maybe found on the host by looking in standard directories.
Similarly, some network services are modiﬁed to allow
an attacker to login with a predeﬁned password that was
compiled into the system. Many of the trojan servers will
store the MD5 of the back door password so that the pass-
word is not easily found when viewing the ASCII strings
of the executable. A trojan server maybe detected by look-
ing for a password or a 128-bit hexadecimalvalue in the ex-
ecutable strings. The chkrootkit program uses these types
of signature techniques to ﬁnd rootkits that are installed on
hosts [8].
Signature detection of trojan ﬁles has the same limi-
tations as signature detection for network attacks; it only
works for known trojan ﬁles. Furthermore,it is trivial to ob-
fuscate the strings in the executable ﬁle or store conﬁgura-
tion ﬁles in non-standard places.
The techniques outlined in this section are useful when
examining a couple of hosts, but they do not scale for hun-
dreds or thousands of hosts (unless you have the ﬁle hashes
calculated before the system is deployed).We will next out-
line steps to reduce the effort required to identify suspect
systems when the original hashes are not known and hash
databases do not exist for all types and patch levels of your
systems.
3. General Detection Theory
In this section, we present our method for identifying
sets of hosts with trojan executables installed on them. Our
method does not rely on a database of known good or bad
hashes or signatures of trojan ﬁles. The general process is
to cluster similar hosts together based on system executa-
bles and analyze the groups instead of the individual sys-
tems.
The hashes from the systems must be collected in a se-
cure fashion. A compromised host could send false data
when requested for hash values, so trusted media and, ide-
ally, a trusted kernel should be used. The hash values for
speciﬁc ﬁles are calculated on each host and sent to a cen-
tral analysis station. The hosts with the same operating sys-
tem are grouped together and analyzed. Patch levels within
the operating system version are not used in this analysis.
The details of our collection utility are outlined in the Sec-
tion 4.
The remainder of this section describes the general the-
ory of host clusters and then two detection techniques are
presented.
3.1. Clusters of Hosts
Hosts can be organized into sets based on their sys-
tem executables. We assume that system executables and
libraries in a host are changed by administrators who ap-
ply patches or by attackers who install trojan ﬁles. All sys-
tems start in the same set, the one for unpatched systems.
When a system is patched and the system executables and
libraries are changed, the system is removed from its cur-
rent set and placed into a new set. For example, let set C0
be the set of hosts that have no patches applied and let hostw/Trojan #1
Patch #1
w/Trojan #2
C_5 C_4
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w/Trojan #1
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Figure 1. Sets of hosts with four patch sets
and three trojan sets
h1 ∈ C0. When a patch is applied to host h1 ∈ C0, a trans-
formation removes h1 from C0 and adds it to C1.
C0 = C0 \ h1
C1 = C1 ∪ h1
Sets that contain hosts with only valid executables are
patch sets. All hosts start in a patch set when they are
deployed. A trojan set contains hosts that have been re-
moved from a patch set because they had trojan executa-
bles installed on them. The installation of trojan ﬁles can be
thought of as an unauthorized patch because it forces sys-
tems to changesets. Figure1 showsan environmentthat has
four patch sets (C0, C1, C2, and C3) and three trojan sets
(C4, C5, and C6). Hosts in C4 and C5 both have the same
patch applied, but they have different trojan ﬁles and there-
fore are in different sets.
Note that the clusters can be created in more general
terms. Clusters in the above description are created with
hosts of the exact same hashes, but they can also be cre-
atedwith hoststhatarea givendistance,D, fromeachother.
The above description creates clusters with a distance of 0.
3.2. Naive Detection Process
A naive detection method using the sets of hosts is to
choose one of the hosts from each set and analyze it. If hash
databases or other techniques outlined in Section 2 exist,
then they can be utilized. If the host is found to have been
compromised, then the entire set is a trojan set and they all
have trojan ﬁles on them. If trojan ﬁles were not found,then
the set is likely a patch set. This method allows the admin-
istrator to reduce the number of hosts that must be investi-
gated,unless each set has only one host in it. This technique
does not help the investigatorto focus on speciﬁc sets to an-
alyze though.
/bin/ls
Patched
/bin/ls
Trojan
/bin/ls
Trojan
Trojan Set
C_m
Patch #j
C_j C_i
Figure 2. Two patch sets that link to the same
trojan set
3.3. Threshold Detection Process
Tohelptheinvestigatorfocusonspeciﬁcsystems,weuse
a threshold.This techniqueuses the assumptionthat the tro-
jansets will containfewerhoststhanthepatchsets. Thesize
of each set is examined and if the size of the set is smaller
than a threshold T, then the set is identiﬁed as a possible
trojan set. One host from each of the suspect sets can be ex-
amined in more detail to identify if the set is a patch set or a
trojan set. An implementation of this could keep a database
of conﬁrmed patch sets to prevent future false positives.
Note that this process does not directly rely on the num-
ber of ﬁles that are updated in each patch. It only relies on
the number of hosts that have applied the patch and the
number of hosts that have trojan ﬁles installed. Although,
if a patch modiﬁes the same system executables as a rootkit
does, then the trojan set for the two patch sets will be the
same. For example, let patch Pj be applied to a subset of
the hosts in set Ci. Pj updates only the /bin/ls ﬁle and
it moves the hosts to set Cj. Let there be a rootkit that mod-
iﬁes only the /bin/ls ﬁle. If the rootkit is installed on
hosts in Ci and Cj, then the hosts will both be in the same
trojan set, Cm. This example can be seen in Figure 2. This
set may not be detected by our algorithm because it is the
unionoftwo sets andits size couldbelargerthanthe thresh-
old.
The probability of ﬁnding the trojan installations in-
creases with the number of types of trojan ﬁles that are in-
stalled on a patch set. For example,if there are 100 compro-
mised hosts for a given patch set and only two rootkits are
installed, then there will be two trojan sets with an average
of 50 hosts per set. On the other hand, if there are 10 rootk-
its among the 100 compromised hosts, then there will be 10
trojan sets and an average of 10 hosts per set. If the thresh-
old is set between 10 and 49, then the algorithm will detect
the sets of 10 and not the sets of 50.4. Implementation
To test the detection methods, we created a sample data
set of hashes and implemented the detection process. This
sectionwill describehowthedata set was created,the meth-
ods used for statistical detection, and the detection results.
4.1. Utilities
Theﬁrst step inthe implementationwas todevelopa col-
lections agent to gather the hashes, a data dumper to format
the hash data, and an analysis tool to examine the formated
data. Our implementation of these utilities are sweeper,
datadumper, and stathost. We brieﬂy discuss these
tools below.
Our implementation of the collections agent, sweeper,
takes a list of hosts to be surveyed and a list of ﬁles on the
host that should be hashed. sweeper used SSH to con-
nect to each host and executed the local version of md5sum
to calculate the checksums. Once data was “swept” up, the
hashes, host names and system types were inserted into a
database. The database schema we used is speciﬁed in the
Appendix.
Our analysis tool, stathost, was written in Matlab
[7] and therefore the data had to be translated from the
database format to a format that Matlab could process. The
datadumper tool gathered informationfrom the database
and put it into a format usable by stathost. The details
of stathost are described in Section 4.3.
4.2. Data Set Creation
Although we wrote sweeper to collect hashes from re-
mote systems, we did not have access to an environment
large enough to utilize it for testing our process. It would
also be difﬁcult to maintain control of a live environment
that large so that we knew how many hosts were indeed
compromised. Therefore, we created a sample data set of
hashes that could be analyzed with our detection process.
The data set that was generated was the equivalent to run-
ning collection tools on many hosts and storing the sets of
hashes in one location. This section outlines how the data
set was created.
To generate the data sets, we had to specify the percent-
age of hosts that are typically compromised, the percentage
of compromised hosts that have executables modiﬁed, and
the number of ﬁles that are modiﬁed by attackers. We also
had to specify how many systems were fully patched, how
manywerepartiallypatched,andhowmanyhadnopatches.
Unfortunately,we could not ﬁnd any statistics on these val-
ues. Therefore, we estimated these values and varied them
to compare the detection algorithm’s performance.
The data set had Y types of systems and X systems in
each type.For our trials we set Y = 1, howeverthis number
won’t impact the accuracy of the algorithm. Setting Y > 1
will simply segregate the data into Y sets, because between
systems the duplication of binaries is rare. Also, we expect
that the collection tool will sort the data by operating sys-
tem. Each system had Z hashes collected from it.
To create multiple patch sets, we simulated the process
of applying patches. Let A be the percentage of hosts in
a type that have no patches applied, B be the percentage of
hosts in a type that have all patches applied,and the remain-
der of the hosts, C percent, be those that have some of the
patches applied.
For example, an environment would have Y = 4 if So-
laris 5.7,Solaris 5.8,RedHat Linux8.1,and MicrosoftWin-
dows XP were deployed; X = 200 if there were 200 hosts
of each platform; and Z = 75 if there were 75 ﬁles on
each host to examine. For the patch values, an environment
would have A = 30 if 30 percent of the systems had no
patches applied, B = 30 if 30 percent of the systems were
fully patched,and C = 40 if 40 percentof the systems were
partially patched.
ThedatasetwasgeneratedbycalculatingZ randomhash
values for each type of system and populating each host
with them. Therefore, all hosts in the operating system type
had the same starting hash values. The A percent of hosts
that had no patches applied kept the original hash values
and formeda patch set. The B percent of hosts that are fully
patched had 35 percent of the original hash values changed
to new random values and added to a new patch set. All
hosts that were fully patched had the same set of hashes. In
other words, we assumed that a fully patched system had
35 percent of its system executables modiﬁed from the ini-
tial installation.
To create the patch sets for hosts with a partial number
of patchesapplied,some of the changesthat were appliedto
the fully patched hosts were applied to the remaining hosts
(C percent of the total). The ﬁrst 20 percent of the partially
patched hosts had 15 percent of the changes that were ap-
pliedtothefullypatchedsystems,thesecond20percenthad
30 percent of the changes, the third 20 percent had 45 per-
cent of the changes, the fourth 20 percent had 60 percent of
the changes, and the ﬁnal 20 percent had 75 percent of the
changes. These modiﬁcations were used to simulate an en-
vironmentwhere manyhosts had only some subset of avail-
able patches applied, as would be the case for many real en-
vironments.
Q percent of the hosts that were not fully patched were
chosen at random to become compromised systems. 2 per-
cent of the hashes for the selected host were changed. The
assumption was that fully patched systems would not be
compromised and that only a small fraction of the actual
system executables would be modiﬁed. For example, a typ-Figure 3. The size of host clusters in a sam-
ple data set
ical Unix rootkit only modiﬁes ﬁve or six of the executables
in the /bin/ directory.
The modiﬁcations to the compromised Q percent of the
hosts were subject to alteration by specifying a number of
rootkits, R. For all our simulations we speciﬁed R = 5.
The rootkits were equally distributed among the compro-
mised hosts and a random rootkit was created for every Rth
compromisedhost. This method was used to simulate some
standard rootkits being used across the data set, but non-
standard ones being used occasionally as well. One thing
that was not considered, for the sake of simplicity, was
rootkits that only impact one type of system (e.g. a spe-
ciﬁc patch level). In reality this type of localized cluster-
ing would help the algorithm, because a stronger correla-
tion would be seen.
As an example of an environment in our data set, Fig-
ure 3 shows the results from clustering the hosts in one of
the data sets based on their ﬁle signatures. The x-axis is the
cluster number and the y-axis is the number of hosts in a
cluster. We can see the 1000 hosts have been broken down
to 29 clusters. If the threshold were set to 250, then all clus-
ters except for cluster 22 would be identiﬁed as suspect. If
the threshold were set to 40, then all clusters besides 1, 2, 5,
9, 15, 18, and 22 would be identiﬁed.
4.3. Detection Procedure
The stathost application was written in Matlab to
process the data sets and detect the compromised systems
using the threshold detection technique. The implementa-
tion includes a distance metric for determining the relative
closeness of hosts, a clustering method for grouping hosts,
and an extension for more localized clustering. While the
procedurewas originally described using set theory, we im-
plemented it using matrices. Before moving onto the theo-
ries, we deﬁne some commonly terms used.
We beginby populatinga matrix A, of size Z×(X ∗Y ),
where Z is the number of hashes and X ∗ Y is the total
numberof systems being surveyed.A row in A contains the
hashes for one ﬁle on different systems and a column in A
contains the ﬁle hashes for one system. We use the notation
|A| and ||A|| to denotethe numberof rows and columns,re-
spectively, in a matrix or vector A. A:,n denotes all rows of
column n of matrix A. Am,n denotes the cell at row m, col-
umn n of matrix A. Also, the terms “system” and “host”
may be used synonymously.
We deﬁne the distance between two hosts H1 and H2
represented by column vectors of the same size as follows:
d(H1,H2) = |H1| − Σ(H1 == H2)
H1 == H2 returns a column vector consisting of a zero
where rows in H1 and H2 were not equal and a one where
rows in H1 and H2 were equal. Σ(H1 == H2) returns
a sum of the binary values in the new column vector re-
turned by H1 == H2. Therefore the distance between H1
and H2 is 0 when every row is equal, and the distance be-
tween H1 and H2 is |H1| when there are no rows of equal
value. We say that two hosts are equal with respect to their
column vectors when their distance is 0.
Our process takes a matrix A, the desireddistance D and
a threshold T. The return value is a new matrix, σ, whose
nonzero columns correspond to hosts in a cluster with dis-
tance D and a size less than orequal to T. The returnmatrix
was calculated using the following method:
σ(A,D,T) = [x|(
||A|| X
i=1
Σ(
||A|| X
j=i
d(A:,i,A:,j) = D) ≤ T;
∀Ai ∈ A,Ai ∈ x)]
This method creates σ by iterating over all columns of
the matrix A, ﬁnding the distance between A:,i and the re-
maining columns. If the total number of these columns is
≤ T then we copy the columns to the same location in
σ. This process does not iterate over columns that have al-
readybeen includedin a cluster. The numberof members in
a cluster can be determinedeasily by the sum of all nonzero
columns of distance D in σ.
While matrix σ and A will both be of the same size, it
should be noted that, in general, σ ⊂ A for the nonzero
rows of σ. The only case where
∀i,j σi,j = Ai,j
is true, is the case where there are no clusters in A whose
size is less than or equal to T.When D = 0, a host can fall into only one cluster and
this property is important for analysis purposes because
hosts in more than one cluster represent duplicate work that
may need to be done. Duplicate hosts may also contribute
unnecessarily to a cluster’s size.
After this procedure, a list of clusters and hosts is re-
turned to the user and a single host from each cluster can
be sampled to determine if it is compromised. Discovering
a compromisedsystem that is part of a cluster indicates that
every host in the cluster is compromised.
The procedure discussed is a simple one. For environ-
ments where the majority of hosts are not compromised,
the large clusters will contain hosts that are not compro-
mised and some of the smaller clusters will contain hosts
that are compromised. For environments where the major-
ity of the hosts are compromised, some of the large clus-
ters may contain hosts that are compromised. For the sec-
ondscenario, it is necessaryto invertthe clustering function
such that hosts above the threshold are detected.
4.4. Detection Results
The simulated data sets were analyzed with the detec-
tion process and the results can be found in Table 1. We
used 18 different test cases and varied the number of hosts,
the percentageof patched hosts, and the percentageof com-
promised hosts. The threshold, T, was kept constant at ﬁve
percentof the total hosts so that we could“blind”the results
on the simulated data. In a real world situation the thresh-
oldwould likely not be kept constantbecause the numberof
compromised systems would not be known ahead of time.
Our detection procedure used a distance, D, of 0 when cre-
ating the host clusters.
The number of false positives is the number of clusters
that were selected as being compromised, but did not con-
tain compromised hosts. Individual hosts were not counted
towards false positives, because if one host in a cluster was
a false positive, all hosts in the cluster were false positives
and only one would need to be investigated. The accuracy
of our procedure can be assessed using the percentage of
compromised hosts that were successfully detected and the
number of false positives.
The results show that our process detects a high percent-
age of the compromised systems and has a low number of
false positives. When 1 percent of the hosts were compro-
mised, we detected all of them and had no false positives.
When 10 percent of the hosts were compromised, we de-
tected between 90 and 100 percent of them and only had
one scenario with false positives. When 50 percent of the
hosts were compromised, we detected between 40 and 77
percent of them and 4 of the 6 scenarios had false positives.
The number of false positives was higher when we had a
smaller number of hosts.
To improve the accuracy of the detection method, the
threshold can be modiﬁed. Generally, to increase the num-
ber of systems that are successfully detected, then the
threshold should be increased, and to decrease the num-
ber of false positives then the threshold should be de-
creased. Our data shows that even an educated guess for the
threshold can yield useful results.
Table 1 supports our hypothesis for the synthesized data
set. One should note that for each trial (represented by a
row of the table), a different data set was generated with
random hash values. Our data shows that the accuracy of
detection decreases and the number of false positives in-
creases as the percentage of compromised hosts increases
and the threshold is held constant. This is because the size
of the clusters with no compromised hosts (patch sets) fall
below the threshold and the size of the clusters with com-
promised hosts (trojan sets) rise above the threshold as the
number of compromised hosts increase. However, our tests
were done using a static value for the threshold and the ac-
curacy could have been increased by modifying this appro-
priately. Using a larger threshold will identify the compro-
mised hosts, but it will likely also increase the number of
false positives.
This process relies on trends in systems. If no trends can
be found, no clustering can occur and the number of sys-
tems that need to be surveyed does not decrease. The opti-
mal trend is for all systems to be uniform because detecting
anomalies in this case is trivial. The worst case scenario is
for every system to be different. Our results show that even
in the case when the systems vary (many different clusters),
the rate of detection is still very high and the number of
false positives remains low. For example, Figure 4 shows a
graph representing clusters of hosts from one of the simula-
tions where 50 percent of the hosts are compromised.There
were 25 different clusters for only 100 hosts, however there
was a 62 percent detection rate and only one cluster with
false positives. For this speciﬁc scenario, a higher threshold
would have improved the results. We used a static thresh-
old of 5 percent of hosts, which is 5 in this scenario, and
there are two clusters containing 6 compromised hosts each
and one cluster containing 7 compromised hosts. Increas-
ing the threshold by a small amount in this scenario would
have found all the compromisedhosts and not increased the
number of false positives.
Statistical analysis on our data sets consisted of a three
part process in which a distance metric determined the host
clusters, a threshold identiﬁed suspect clusters, and a new
dataset was producedtodeterminetheaccuracyofthespec-
iﬁed distance and threshold. If further reﬁnement of a data
set is needed,this processallows us toeasily changethe dis-
tancevariable,D, andthe threshold,T. Forouranalysis, we
did not vary these values and kept D = 0 and T as ﬁve per-
cent of the the total hosts.Hosts Patch Levels Compromised Threshold Detected False Positives
(X) None (A) All (B) Partial (C) Hosts (Q) (T) (in clusters)
100 30% 15% 55% 1 (1%) 5 1/1 (100%) 0
100 15% 30% 55% 1 (1%) 5 1/1 (100%) 0
100 55% 15% 30% 1 (1%) 5 1/1 (100%) 0
100 30% 15% 55% 10 (10%) 5 9/10 (90%) 0
100 15% 30% 55% 10 (10%) 5 10/10 (100%) 0
100 55% 15% 30% 10 (10%) 5 10/10 (100%) 4
100 30% 15% 55% 50 (50%) 5 31/50 (62%) 1
100 15% 30% 55% 50 (50%) 5 29/50 (58%) 2
100 55% 15% 30% 50 (50%) 5 20/50 (40%) 5
1000 30% 15% 55% 10 (1%) 50 10/10 (100%) 0
1000 15% 30% 55% 10 (1%) 50 10/10 (100%) 0
1000 55% 15% 30% 10 (1%) 50 10/10 (100%) 0
1000 30% 15% 55% 100 (10%) 50 94/100 (94%) 0
1000 15% 30% 55% 100 (10%) 50 92/100 (92%) 0
1000 55% 15% 30% 100 (10%) 50 95/100 (95%) 0
1000 30% 15% 55% 500 (50%) 50 386/500 (77%) 0
1000 15% 30% 55% 500 (50%) 50 335/500 (67%) 0
1000 55% 15% 30% 500 (50%) 50 205/500 (41%) 5
Table 1. Detection results using the simulated data sets
Figure 4. Size of clusters in data set with 50%
compromised hosts
5. Future Work
For a practical implementation, several changes to the
collection tool, sweeper, would need to take place. First,
the use of SSH may be inappropriatein some cases because
the system may not be running it or the administrator run-
ning the collections agent may not have access to the sys-
tem.Analternativetogatheringtheneededhasheswouldbe
to distribute CDs with sweeper on them. System adminis-
trators can run the CD on their hosts and send the collected
data back for analysis.
Testing these theories on a large scale network would
be useful. The lack of statistics for the numbers of com-
promised systems and patch frequency made it difﬁcult to
judge if our results properly reﬂect reality.
Hash values are useful because they provide unique val-
ues for a ﬁle, but they are limited because they do not show
how different two ﬁles are. Measurements other than hash
valuesshouldbe investigatedfor this typeof analysis.Static
analysis techniques on executables, such as ﬂow graphs and
system call lists, could yield better clustering results.
Another possible expansion upon our existing work
would be that of multiple thresholds. Several thresh-
olds would be speciﬁed to the clustering function and
clusters are returned with a priority. This would allow ad-
ministrators to prioritize the order in which they investigate
the hosts.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented techniques using clusters of
hosts to detect the modiﬁcation of ﬁles. These techniques
are most useful in large-scale environments where there
are a minority number of compromised hosts. However the
methods presented can be modiﬁed via input parameters, towork well in other situations. This procedure does not need
signatures of every operating system and patch level.
Overall our results showed that the detection rate was
high when the threshold was set at an appropriate level and
a minorityof the systems werecompromised.Thethreshold
being used for our trials was inappropriate when the num-
ber of compromised hosts was large, which caused a higher
number of false positives and a lower detection rate. De-
spite this, the overall clustering technique was still success-
ful in that it reduced the number of systems needed for a
representative sample.
Appendix
Below is a listing of our schema (implemented using
MySQL) for sweeper. It should be noted that this schema
is a variable one, in that the exact structure for a table is
not known until sweeper is run, and the applications want-
ing to be surveyed are known.
CREATE TABLE tbl_name (
hostname TEXT NOT NULL,
app1 VARCHAR(64),
...
appN VARCHAR(64)
);
Where tbl name is the result of running the command
uname -msr (or something similar for machine with-
out the uname binary) and hostname is the host speci-
ﬁed in the hosts list. app1-appN have a 1-1 correspon-
dence with applications listed in the applications list, and
the value is the md5 hash.
References
[1] B. Carrier. The Sleuth Kit, 2003. Available at:
http://www.sleuthkit.org/sleuthkit/.
[2] Cyber Abuse. Rootk(it)ID Project, 2003. Available at:
http://rk.cyberabuse.org/.
[3] GNU. Textutils, 2003. Available at:
http://www.gnu.org/directory/GNU/textutils.html.
[4] HashKeeper. HashKeeper Databases, 2003. Available at:
http://www.hashkeeper.org.
[5] The Honeynet Group. Know Your Enemy, 2003. Available
at: http://www.honeynet.org.
[6] J. Kornblum. MD5 Deep, 2003. Available at:
http://md5deep.sourceforge.net/.
[7] The MathWorks. Matlab, 2003. Available at:
http://www.mathworks.com/.
[8] N. Murilo and K. Steding-Jessen. chkrootkit, 2003. Avail-
able at: http://www.chkrootkit.org.
[9] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Se-
cure Hash Standard - FIPS PUB 180, May 1993.
[10] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Na-
tional Software Reference Libarary, 2003. Available at:
http://www.nsrl.nist.gov.
[11] R. Rivest. The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, April 1992.
Available at: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt.
[12] RPM. RPM Package Manager, 2003. Available at:
http://www.rpm.org/.
[13] Security Focus. Incidents Mailing List, 2003. Available at:
http://www.securityfocus.com.
[14] Sun Microsystems. Solaris Fingerprint Database,
2003. Available at: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-
cgi/ﬁleFingerprints.pl.
[15] Tripwire Inc. Tripwire, 2003. Available at:
http://www.tripwire.com.